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Abstract
We develop a model of vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets which
highlights the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit. The existing moneylen-
der, the bank o¢cial and the new moneylenders move sequentially and the existing moneylender
acts as a Stackelberg leader and unilaterally decides on the informal interest rate. The analysis
distinguishes between two di¤erent ways of designing a credit subsidy policy. If a credit subsidy
policy is undertaken through an increase in the supply of institutional credit, it is likely to
increase the competitiveness in the informal credit market and lower the informal sector interest
rate under reasonable parametric restrictions. Any change in the formal sector interest rate has
no e¤ect. However, an anticorruption measure (increase in penalty) unambiguously lowers the
interest rate in the informal credit market. Finally, we examine the e¤ects of alternative policies
on the incomes of di¤erent economic agents in our model.
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1 Introduction
Forging a vertical linkage between formal and informal credit markets is considered to be one of
many di¤erent ways to pursue a liberalized policy in the …nancial markets in emerging economies.
Under this policy, formal credit is supplied to the informal sector lenders with a view to enhance
competition between them so that the ultimate borrowers receive credit at a reasonable interest
rate. The informal sector lenders act as …nancial intermediaries between the formal credit agency
and the …nal borrowers of credit. This policy has been experimented with some success in the
Philippines (see Umali, 1990).
There are a few papers in the theoretical literature that analyses the economic e¤ects of building
such a vertical linkage. Some papers discuss as to why the policy may not ultimately be able to suc-
ceed. For example, Ho¤ and Stiglitz (1996) have argued that this policy may be counterproductive
and actually raise the informal sector interest rate since extending formal credit to the informal
lenders paves the way for the entry of new lenders in the informal credit market which in turn
makes loan recovery from the borrowers more di¢cult and this leads to an increase in the cost of
loan administration for every lender. Bose (1998) has shown that the policy of vertical linkage may
in fact produce adverse e¤ects on the borrowing terms faced by the small and marginal borrowers.
He considered a situation where the informal sector lenders have asymmetric information regarding
the borrowers’ ability to repay loans and competition between them determines the interest rate
in the informal credit market. If in such a situation a credit subsidy policy is undertaken, it would
enable the better-informed informal sector lender to attract better borrowers with lower probability
of default and consequently leave the reaming borrowers with high probability of default for the
other lender. As a result, the second lender may not …nd it pro…table to continue the lending
operation and may …nally leave the credit market. In such a situation, the borrowing terms in
the informal credit market will deteriorate. Furthermore, Floro and Ray (1997) have shown that a
credit ‡ow to the lenders in the informal credit market may strengthen the ability and incentive of
the informal lenders to collude among themselves, which would result in worse terms faced by the
borrowers in the informal credit market. Finally, Chaudhuri and Dastidar (CD hereafter) (2011)
have shown that presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit might be another factor
behind the failure of the policy of vertical linkage.
The present work is an extension of CD (2011). We develop a model of vertical linkage between
the formal and informal credit markets that highlights the presence of corruption in the distribution
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of formal credit. The existing moneylender, the bank o¢cial and the new moneylenders move
sequentially and the existing moneylender acts as a Stackelberg leader and unilaterally decides on
the informal interest rate. The analysis distinguishes between two di¤erent ways of designing a
credit subsidy policy. If a credit subsidy policy is undertaken through an increase in the supply
of institutional credit, it is likely to increase the competitiveness in the informal credit market
and lower the informal sector interest rate under reasonable parametric restrictions. This result is
di¤erent from that of the CD (2011) work. The present paper then goes on to show that any change
in the formal sector interest rate has no e¤ect on the informal interest. However, an anticorruption
measure (increase in penalty) unambiguously lowers the interest rate in the informal credit market.
Finally, the e¤ects of alternative policies on the incomes of di¤erent economic agents have also been
examined. These e¤ects have not been examined in CD (2011).
2 The Model
We closely follow CD(2011). There is a rural credit market with a single formal credit agency (a
bank). The bank o¢cial is given the task of distributing a given amount of bank credit, , to
people who would re-lend the money to the farmers of the village. Let  denote the very large
number of homogeneous new moneylenders applying for the bank credit. But how many of them,
, would ultimately get the formal credit is decided by the bank o¢cial. The bank o¢cer demands
a bribe  per unit of bank credit given to the fringe moneylenders. This amount is withheld as ‘cut
money’ from the bank credit at the time of disbursal.
There are three stages of the game. In the …rst stage, the dominant moneylender determines
the informal interest, , as he knows the behavioural patterns of the bank o¢cial and the fringe
moneylenders. In the second stage of the game the bank o¢cial decides on the bribing rate, , and
the number of new moneylenders,  who actually get the credit. In the …nal stage of the game, each
fringe moneylender determines the amount of formal credit that he would apply for. The amount
of formal credit that each new moneylender receives,  , is also determined in the process.
We now turn to analyze the behaviour and payo¤ function of the di¤erent economic agents in
this model.
Fringe moneylenders We start with the fringe moneylenders who move in the third stage. Each
fringe moneylender decides the amount of formal credit that he would apply for. If a fringe money
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lender is formally approved of  amount of credit, the amount that he actually gets in hand is
 (1¡ ) since  is to be paid as bribe to the bank o¢cial. He can now use this amount i.e.
(1¡ ) to disburse as a loan and earn an interest rate of  on it. Let  be the formal interest
rate, and  () be the cost of loan enforcement. It’s given that  (0) = 0. Also  0 ()  0 and
 00 ()  0 for all   0. Since this person has been formally approved of  amount of credit, he
has to pay back (1 + ) to the bank.
The income of each fringe moneylender is therefore
  = [(1 + ) (1¡ )¡ (1 + )] ¡ 
¡
 (1¡ )
¢
.
We assume that the reservation income of each moneylender is zero. We now proceed to the bank
o¢cial.
The bank o¢cial The bank o¢cial moves in the second stage and chooses the bribing rate, ,
and the number of new moneylenders,  who actually get the credit. Let  be the formal credit
received by each of the  fringe moneylenders in the third stage. Let  () be the probability of
that the bank o¢cial gets caught if he takes a bribe.  () satis…es the following properties. (i)
 (0) = 0, (ii)  0 ()  0 8  0 and (iii)  00 ()  0 8  0.  is the …xed money value of
penalty in the case of detection of the bribery. The bank o¢cial is assumed to be risk neutral and
his expected income is
  =  ¡  ().
It may be noted that the bank o¢cial while choosing  and  must see to it that   ¸ 0 (the
reservation income constraint of each fringe money lender) and  ¸  (the credit constraint
that he himself faces).
The dominant moneylender The dominant moneylender moves in the …rst stage and chooses
the informal interest, . Let  be the opportunity interest rate of the dominant money lender.
 () is the aggregate demand function for credit by the ultimate borrowers (farmers). We assume
 0 ()  0 and  00 () · 0. Note that  (1¡ ) is the aggregate supply of actual formal credit
(after bribe has been paid) going to the fringe moneylenders. Since this amount is supplied to
the farmers as loans, the net demand function of credit faced by the dominant moneylender is
 ()¡  (1¡ ) . Hence, the income of the dominant moneylender is
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 = (¡ )
£
 ()¡  (1¡ )
¤

We also assume that the dominant moneylender has no cost of enforcing loan repayment. This can
be justi…ed by the hierarchical structure of a rural society where the dominant moneylender enjoys
enormous clout.
3 Solving for the three stage game
3.0.1 Third stage
The fringe moneylender moves and chooses  ¸ 0 to maximise
  = [(1 + ) (1¡ )¡ (1 + )] ¡ 
¡
 (1¡ )
¢

The …rst and second order conditions for maximisation are as follows.
  =
 

= (1+ ) (1¡ )¡ (1 + )¡  0
¡
 (1¡ )
¢
(1¡ ) = 0¡¡ (1)
and   =
2 
2
= ¡ 00
¡
 (1¡ )
¢
(1¡ )2  0¡¡¡ (1)
Note that the second order condition
¡
   0
¢
is always satis…ed since  00 ()  0. Solving (1)
and (1) we get  . Note that if (1 + ) (1¡ ) ¡ (1 + )  0 then  = 0. Also,   0 =)
(1 + ) (1¡ )¡ (1 + )  0. Therefore
  = [(1 + ) (1¡ )¡ (1 + )]¡
¡
 (1¡ )
¢
 0 =) (1 + ) (1¡ )¡(1 + )  0¡¡¡¡ (2)
From (1) we get that if   0 then
(1 + ) (1¡ )¡ (1 + ) =  0
¡
 (1¡ )
¢
(1¡ ) 
That is, if   0 we get that (from (1))
 =
1
1¡ 
 0¡1
µ
1 + ¡
1 + 
1¡ 
¶
¡¡¡ (3)
Note that  =


 0 (since  00 ()  0)¡¡¡¡(3)
and the sign of  =


is ambiguous.¡¡¡¡ (3)
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3.0.2 Second stage
We now fold the game backwards and solve the second stage. In this stage the bank o¢cial moves
and chooses  and  ·  to maximise   subject to   ¸ 0 and  ¸  . Using (2) it may be
noted that the o¢cial maximises
  =  ¡  ()
 1 ( ) = ¡  · 0
2 ( ) =  ¡  · 0
and 3 ( ) = ¡ · 0
The relevant Lagrangian is
 =  ¡  () + 1
 + 2
¡
 ¡ 
¢
+ 3 ( ¡ )
In an interior equilibrium, the 1OCs and the complementary slackness conditions are as follows.
 =


=  +  ¡ 
0 () + 1

 ¡ 2

 = 0¡¡¡¡(4)
 =


=  ¡ 2
 ¡ 3 = 0¡¡¡¡ (4)
1 =

1
=   ¸ 0¡¡¡¡ (4)
1
µ

1
¶
= 1
 = 0¡¡¡¡ (4)
2 =

2
=  ¡  ¸ 0¡¡¡¡ (4)
2
µ

2
¶
= 2
¡
 ¡ 
¢
= 0¡¡¡¡ (4)
3 =

3
=  ¡  ¸ 0¡¡¡¡¡ (4)
3

3
= 3 ( ¡ ) = 0¡¡¡¡ (4)
Note that in any non-trivial equilibrium    0 and this implies (from 4d) that 1 = 0. Since we
have assumed that  is very large, in equilibrium    . This means 3 = 0 (from 4h).
In equilibrium  ¡  = 0. This is because of the following reason. If  ¡   0 then
the o¢cial can increase his payo¤ simply by increasing . Therefore,  ¡  0 cannot arise in
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equilibrium. Hence, the binding constraint is the second constraint (which is 2 ()). Note that
2 =
2 ()

=  and
2 =
2 ()

=  
Therefore the second order condition for the maximisation is as follows.
det
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
  ¡
2

  ¡
2

¡2 ¡
2
 0
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
 0
Remark 1 It may be noted that the second order condition will be valid only if  00 ()  0 (which
we have assumed to be the case).
Then, using the fact that 1 = 0 = 3 and that 
2 () = 0 in equilibrium, we get the following
from (4a) to (4h).
 +  ( ¡ 2)

 ¡ 
0 () = 0¡¡¡¡(5)
( ¡ 2)
 = 0¡¡¡¡ (5)
 =  ¡¡¡ (5)
From (5a) to (5c) we can solve for , 2 and . That is, we will get  and  as functions of 
(which has been chosen by the existing moneylender in the …rst stage),  and . Note that  and
 are given exogenously.
From (5b) we get that  ¡ 2 = 0 since 
  0 (in any non-trivial equilibrium) . This implies
(from 5a and 5c)
 ¡  0 () = 0¡¡¡¡ (6) 
Since  0 () is a strictly monotonic function, we have in equilibrium
 =  0¡1
µ


¶
¡¡¡¡(7)
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Hence we have
 =


= 0¡¡¡¡¡ (8)
 =


= 0¡¡¡¡(8)
 =


=
1
 00
³
 0¡1
³


´´ =
1
 00 ()
¡¡¡¡ (8)
and  =


= ¡

2 00 ()
¡¡¡¡ (8) 
3.0.3 First stage
We now solve the …rst stage. In this stage the dominant moneylender chooses  to maximise
 = (¡ )
£
 ()¡  (1¡ )
¤

Note that from the second stage equilibrium condition we know that  = 
¡
  
¢
and  = .
The dominant moneylender will take this into account (like a Stackelberg leader) to maximise
  = (¡ )
£
 ()¡ (1¡ )
¤

The conditions for maximisation are as follows. We use (8a), (8b) and (8c) to derive them.
 =


= (¡ ) 0 () +  ()¡  (1¡ ) = 0¡¡¡ (9)
and  =
2 
2
= (¡ ) 00 () + 2 0 ()  0¡¡(9)
Note that (9b) is always satis…ed since we have assumed that  0 ()  0 and  00 () · 0.
Subgame Perfect equilibrium Note that in our model the parameters are , ,  and . From
(5c), (7) and (9a) we can compute the subgame perfect equilibrium values of ,  and  (, 
and  respectively). Plugging in the values of  and  in (3) we will get the equilibrium
value of  .
By using (8a), (8b) and (8c) and (9a) we get the following.
 =  [(¡ )  + ] = 0¡¡¡¡(10)


= ¡ (1¡ ) + = ¡ (1¡ ) +

 00 ()
¡¡¡¡(10)
and  =  = ¡

2
2 00 ()
¡¡¡¡ (10)
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Also note that


= ¡


¡¡¡¡(11)


= ¡



¡¡¡¡(11)
and


= ¡


¡¡¡¡ (11) 
In any non-trivial equilibrium where   0 and  2 (0 1) we get the following result.
Proposition 1 (i) 

 = 0. (ii)


 0 provided either  is large enough compared to  or
 00 () is large enough (i.e.  () is su¢ciently convex). (iii) 

  0
Proof (i) Note    0 (9b) and 

 = 0 (10a). Hence from (11a) we get that

 = 0.
(ii) Since  00 ()  0 then 
 00()
 0. However, if  is large enough compared to  then  is
su¢ciently small. Since   1, ¡ (1¡ )  0, and so we get that 

= ¡ (1¡ ) +  00()  0 for
a su¢ciently large . For such a  we have 


 0. Similarly if  00 () is large enough then


= ¡ (1¡ ) + 
 00()
 0. This in turn implies that 


 0. (iii) Since    0 the above
result follows straight from (10c) and (11c).¥
Comment We now try to provide some intuition behind proposition 1. If  decreases  does
not change as equation (7) does not contain . This means that the e¤ective amount of formal
credit injected into the system,  (1¡ ) remains una¤ected which in turn implies that the informal
interest rate, , in the new equilibrium will remain unchanged.
An increase in , on the contrary, changes . But the direction of change must depend on the
curvature of the  () function. As  00 ()  0 in a stable equilibrium,  rises. However, either if 
is su¢ciently large relative to  or if  () is su¢ciently convex, the increase in  is small (relative to
the increase in ) so that (1¡ ) rises. In this situation also  falls as the existing moneylender’s
demand for informal credit falls.
If the government resorts to anticorruption measure in the form of an increase in ,  0 () has
to fall (see equation 6). Consequently,  must decrease in a stable equilibrium. It decreases as
 00 ()  0, which in turn, implies a rise in (1 ¡ ). As a consequence, the demand for informal
credit of the dominant moneylender falls which compels him to lower the informal interest rate, .
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We now proceed to provide a few remarks on  (the number of fringe moneylenders who
actually get the credit in equilibrium). From (5c) we get that  = 

.
Therefore


= ¡


( )
2 ¡¡¡¡(12)
and


=
1
( )2
·
 ¡ 


¸
¡¡¡¡(12)
Since  = 0 (from 8b) and 
 = 11¡
0¡1
³
1 + ¡ 1+1¡
´
(from 3) and  00 ()  0 we get that

  0
Therefore


= ¡


( )2
 0 ¡¡¡¡(13)
Note that 


=  . From (3) we have


=
1
(1¡ )2
2
6
4
(1¡ ) 1
 00(1+¡ 1+1¡)
³


¡ 
1+
(1¡)2
´
+ 0¡1
³
1 + ¡ 1+1¡
´

3
7
5¡¡¡¡(14)
Therefore from (12b) and (14) it is clear that the sign of 


is ambiguous. We summarise this
result in terms of the following proposition.
Proposition 2  always rises with . However, the e¤ect of an increase in  on  is
ambiguous.
Comment It may be noted that while the e¤ect of increasing  on  is ambiguous, with
reasonable restrictions on the parameters it is possible to have a scenario where  increases
with . This will be shown in an example later.
We now provide some comparative static results. It may be noted that ,  and  are the
parameters of our model. The results are as follows. From the discussions above and using (8a-8d)
we obtain:
 

= ¡ ¡
£
(1 + )¡  0 ()
¤ 

= ¡  0
µ
note that


= 0
¶
 

= ¡ (1 + )


 0
µ
note that


 0 as  00 ()  0
¶
 

= ¡ (1 + )


 0
µ
as


 0
¶
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Proposition 3 (i)   always increases with a fall in . (ii)   increases following an increase
in . (ii)   falls following an increase in  
A decrease in the formal interest rate, , lowers the opportunity cost of credit of every fringe
moneylender which in turn raises his net income. Besides, an increase in the gross volume of formal
credit, , raises the bribing rate, , charged by the bank o¢cial per unit of formal credit disbursed
to the new moneylenders as  00 ()  0 in the stable SPE. This a¤ects their pro…tability adversely
and lowers their income. Finally, an anticorruption measure on the bank o¢cial lowers  and hence
improves earnings of the fringe moneylenders.
Di¤erentiating the expression for  and using equations (8a-8d) we get the following:
 

= (¡ )


= 0
 

= ¡ (¡ )
µ
 (1¡ )

¶
 0
0
@
Note that (1¡)

 0 if  is su¢ciently large
relative to  or if  () is su¢ciently convex.
1
A
 

= (¡ )


 0.
Proposition 4 (i) A change in  cannot a¤ect   . (ii) An increase in  lowers   in a stable
equilibrium. (iii) A rise in  lowers  .
A credit subsidy policy in terms of a reduction in the formal interest rate cannot a¤ect the
income of the dominant moneylender as it does not change the bribing rate. On the other hand,
although an increase in  raises the bribing rate, it may also lead to an increase in the net volume
of formal credit,  (1¡ ), injected into the system, provided  is su¢ciently large relative to 
and/or  () is su¢ciently convex. If this happens, the aggregate demand for informal credit of the
moneylender falls and this a¤ects his pro…tably adversely. Furthermore, an increase in  lowers the
o¢cial’s bribing rate which in turn raises the net volume of formal credit injected into the system.
The dominant moneylender in such a situation has no alternative but to charge a lower informal
interest rate that also a¤ects his pro…tability unfavourably.
From the bank o¢cer’s maximisation exercise the following may also be noted.
 

= 0
 

=   0 and
 

= ¡ ()  0
Consequently, we have the following result.
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Proposition 5 (i)   = 0 (ii)    0 and (iii)    0.
A credit subsidy policy, if undertaken through a reduction in the formal interest rate, cannot
a¤ect the income of the o¢cial as bribing rate he charges remains una¤ected. Besides, the o¢cial
has to lower the bribing rate following an anticorruption measure which in turn a¤ects his income
negatively. Finally, an increase in  enables the o¢cial to earn a higher bribe income when he
behaves optimally and chooses the bribing rate.
3.1 An example
Let us have the following.
 () =
1
2
2  () =  where   0 and  6= 1,
 () = 100¡  and  = 0.
Note that  0 () = ¡1  0 for all   0.  00 () =  (¡ 1) ¡2. Hence if  2 (0 1) then
 00 ()  0 and if  2 (11) then  00 ()  0. This means all the assumptions of our model are
satis…ed in the example.
Using (3) we get
 (  ) =
(1 + ) (1¡ )¡ (1 + )
(1¡ )2
¡¡¡¡(16)
Routine computation shows that in our example
 =
µ


¶ 1
¡1
¡¡¡¡ (17)
 =
1
2
2
4100¡
0
@1¡
µ


¶ 1
¡1
1
A
3
5¡¡¡¡ (17)
and  =

µ
1¡
³


´ 1
¡1
¶2
·
1 + 12
½
100¡ 
µ
1¡
³


´ 1
¡1
¶¾¸·
1¡
³


´ 1
¡1
¸
¡ (1 + )
¡¡¡¡ (17) 
Note that


=
1
2
2
4¡1 +
µ


¶ 1
¡1
µ

¡ 1
¶
3
5¡¡¡¡ (18) 
If  2 (0 1) then  00 ()  0 and 


 0 (check proposition 1).
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To illustrate the case of   1 (i.e  00 ()  0) we take  = 2. For this particular value of , we
have


=
1
2
·
¡1 +


¸
 0 i¤   .
The above shows that there are reasonable parametric restrictions which satisfy conditions of corol-
lary 1.
To check that it is possible for  to increase with  we try with two possible values of .
If  = 12 (which implies 
00 ()  0) then from (17c)
 =

µ
1¡
³
2

´¡2
¶2
·
1 + 12
½
100¡
µ
1¡
³
2

´¡2
¶¾¸·
1¡
³
2

´¡2
¸
¡ (1 + )
¡¡¡¡ (19) 
In this particular case


= 16
³
2 ¡ 4
2
´ ¡800
4
+ 122
2
+ 16
4
+ 514 + 122
2

³
¡1600
3
+ 4082 + 16
4
¡ 82
2
+4 + 32
3

´2 ¡¡¡¡ (19) 
Note that if 

¸ 2 then 2 ¡ 4
2
¸ 0 and 4 ¸ 16
4
=) 514 ¸ 816
4
 800
4
. Using this
in the above equation (19) we get that  rises with  (when  = 12).
To check for the case where  00 ()  0 we take  = 2. For this case
 =

³
1¡ 2
´2
h
1 + 12
n
100¡
³
1¡ 2
´oi h
1¡ 2
i
¡ (1 + )
¡¡¡¡ (20)
Here we have


= 16
¡
2 ¡ 
¢

1002 ¡ 150 ¡ 22+ 51
2
+ 3
³
¡4002 + 204 + 42 ¡ 4
2
 +
3
+ 82
´2
= 162
¡
2 ¡
¢
¡
2 ¡ 3
¢
(50¡ ) + 51
2
³
¡4002 + 204 + 42 ¡ 4
2
 + 
3
+ 82
´2 ¡¡¡¡ (20) 
Note that since  is the formal sector rate of interest it is reasonable to suppose that   50 (i.e.
formal sector rate of interest is less than 5000%). From (20) we get that if  32 then


 0
Our example clearly illustrates the main results derived in our paper.
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4 Conclusion
Development economists have often expressed concerns regarding the e¢cacy of the policy of forging
a vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets in achieving its primary objective
to enhance competition and improve the borrowing terms faced by the small and marginal farmers.
It has been shown in the literature that such a policy may indeed be counterproductive under
asymmetric information among informal sector lenders. In this context, we analyse some of the
issues that have not been adequately examined in the earlier works. We show that even without
any asymmetric information problems, this policy may not succeed in the presence of corruption in
the distribution of formal credit. We also show that any change in the formal sector interest rate
has no e¤ect on the informal interest rate while an anticorruption measure (increase in penalty)
unambiguously lowers the interest rate in the informal credit market. Finally, we also examine the
e¤ects of alternative policies on the incomes of di¤erent economic agents.
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